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The Feasibility Of Full State Extraction Of
Punitive Damages Awards
Punitive damages have been awarded by American juries since
the beginning of the nation.1 In 1851, the United States Supreme
Court recognized punitive damages as a firmly established princi-
ple of common law. From the beginning, courts and commentators
have criticized punitive damages because they (1) cause excessive
litigation,3 (2) may subject some defendants to multiple punish-
ments,' (3) incorporate procedures giving juries too much discre-
tion in determining the size of the awards,5 (4) over compensate
plaintiffs,' (5) may surpass the maximum criminal penalties,7 (6)
have been challenged as unconstitutional,8 and (7) negatively affect
American society and economic competitiveness.'
As a result of these criticisms, reformers have called for substan-
tial change in the doctrine of punitive damages, including aboli-
tion."0 Mainly through legislative action, many proposed punitive
1. Jimmie 0. Clements, Jr., Comment, Limiting Punitive Damages: A Placebo for
America's Ailing Competitiveness, 24 ST. MARY'S L.J. 197, 197 (1992).
2. Day v. Woodworth, 54 U.S. 363 (1851).
3. Smith v. Wade, 461 U.S. 30, 59 (1983) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (stating that
punitive damages result in "the encouragement of unnecessary litigation.").
4. LINDA L. SCHLUETER & KENNETH R. REDDEN, PUNITIVE DAMAGES 121 (2d ed. 1989).
5. International Bhd. of Elec. Workers v. Foust, 442 U.S. 42, 50 (1978) (stating "ju-
ries are accorded broad discretion both as to the imposition and amount of punitive dam-
ages, the import of these windfall recoveries is unpredictable and potentially substantial.").
6. Chief Justice Rehnquist stated in Smith v. Wade:
A fundamental premise of our legal system is the notion that damages are awarded to
compensate the victim-to redress the injuries that he or she actually suffered ...
[T]he doctrine of punitive damages permits the award of 'damages' beyond even the
most generous and expansive conception of actual injury to the plaintiff.
461 U.S. at 57-58 (1983) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
7. Roginsky v. Richardson-Merrell, Inc., 378 F.2d 832, 839 (2d Cir. 1967).
8. See Part IV below.
9. David Margolick, Address by Quayle on Justice Proposals Irks Bar Association,
N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 14, 1991, at Al. However, former Vice President Quayle and other reform-
ers' claims of the negative effects of punitive damages, are based on "scanty empirical data
and highly questionable interpretations of those data." Steven Daniels & Joanne Martin,
Myth and Reality in Punitive Damages, 75 MINN. L. REV. 1, 4 (1990). Daniels and Martin
point out that a number of law review articles rely on this questionable data as support for
arguments to reform punitive damages.
10. See, e.g., James B. Sales & Kenneth B. Cole, Jr., Punitive Damages: A Relic That
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damage reforms have been implemented. This reform legislation
falls into three broad categories: (1) changing the common law bur-
den of proof standard,11 (2) placing caps on the amount of punitive
damage awards,12 and (3) abolishing punitive damage awards. s
Another reform, first suggested over a century ago, 4 is state ex-
Has Outlived Its Origins, 37 VAND. L. REV. 1117 (1984); Malcolm E. Wheeler, The Constitu-
tional Case for Reforming Punitive Damages Procedures, 69 VA. L. REV. 269 (1983); Kurt
M. Zitzer, Comment, Punitive Damages: A Cat's Clavicle in Modern Law, 22 J. MARSHALL
L. REv. 657 (1989); Jeffery W. Grass, The Penal Dimensions of Punitive Damages, 12 HAS-
TINGS CONST. L.Q. 241 (1985); Bruce A. Beckman, Constitutional Issues in Insurance Claim
Litigation, 22 TORT & INS. L.J. 244 (1987); Calvin R. Massey, The Excessive Fines Clause
and Punitive Damages: Some Lessons from History, 40 VAND. L. REV. 1233 (1987).
11. A number of states have changed the common law burden of proof standard from
"a preponderance of the evidence" to "by clear and convincing evidence." See, e.g., ALA.
CODE. § 6-11-20(b)(4) (Supp. 1992); ALASKA STAT. § 09.17.020 (1987); CAL. CIv. CODE
§ 3294(a) (West Supp. 1992); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 768.73(1)(b) (West 1992 & Supp. 1993);
IDAHO CODE § 6-1604(1) (1990 & Supp. 1992); IND. CODE. ANN. § 34-4-34-2 (West 1988);
IOWA CODE ANN. § 668A.1(1)(a) (West 1992); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-3701(c) (1987); Ky. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 411.184 (Baldwin 1988); MONT. CODE ANN. § 27-1-221(5) (1991); NEV. REV.
STAT. § 42.005 (1989); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A.58C-5 (West 1988); N.D. CENT. CODE § 32-03.2-
11 (1987); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2307.8(a) (Baldwin 1988) (product liability actions),
§ 2315.21(c)(3) (all other tort actions); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 23, § 9(A) (West 1987); OR.
REV. STAT. § 41.315 (1987); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 60-3701(c) (1987); UTAH CODE ANN.
§ 78-18-1(1)(a) (1989).
Only Colorado has changed the burden of proof standard for proving punitive damages to
"beyond a reasonable doubt." COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-25-127(2) (West 1989).
12. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 6-11-21 (Supp. 1992) (absolute dollar cap); COLO. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 13-21-102(1)(a) (West 1989) (fixed ratio cap); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 52-
240(b) (West 1991) (fixed ratio cap); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 768.73(1)(a), (b) (West 1992 & Supp.
1993)(fixed ratio cap); GA. CODE ANN. § 51-12-5.1(e)-(g) (Michie Supp 1992) (declared un-
constitutional in McBride v. General Motors Corp., 737 F. Supp. 1563 (M.D. Ga. 1990)
(§ 51-12-5.1 violates the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause by requiring the
plaintiff in a products liability action to pay the state 75% of any punitive damages award
while not requiring sharing of punitive damage awards in other actions); KAN. STAT. ANN.
§ 60-3701 (1987) (fixed ratio cap); MONT. CODE ANN. § 27-1-221 (1991) (fixed ratio cap);
NEV. REV. STAT. § 42.005 (1989) (fixed ratio cap); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2307.80(B) (Bald-
win 1988) (fixed ratio cap); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 23, § 9 (West 1987) (fixed ratio cap); TEX.
CIv. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 41.007 (West Supp 1992) (fixed ratio cap); VA. CODE ANN.
§ 8.01-38.1 (Michie 1988) (absolute dollar cap).
13. Only New Hampshire has abolished punitive damages altogether unless they are
permitted by statute. N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 507.16 (1987). However, New Hampshire does
allow what have become known as aggravated damages which are an enlargement of the
compensatory damages based on the defendant's conduct. N. H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 4.11.5
(1987).
Other states have abolished punitive damages against certain defendants, certain types of
cases, or when particular tests are met. JAMES D. GHIARDI & JOHN J. KIRCHER, PUNITIVE
DAMAGES: LAW AND PRACTICE § 21.17 (Callaghan 1989). For example, Oregon prohibits puni-
tive damages against licensed health practitioners. OR. REV. STAT. § 18.550 (1991).
14. Bass v. Chicago & N.W, Ry., 42 Wis. 654 (1877). In Bass, the court stated:
It is difficult on principle to understand why, when the sufferer by a tort has been
fully compensated for his suffering, he should recover anything more. And it is
Comments
traction of punitive damages.' 5
State extraction statutes provide that part of any punitive dam-
age award is to be paid to the state or a fund created by the
state. 6 No state, however, requires the entire punitive damage
award be paid to it.'7 This comment will focus on the feasibility of
full statutory extraction of punitive damages as a means of taking
the windfall of punitive damages away from the plaintiff and com-
pensating society for the injury the defendant inflicted upon it.
Part I of this comment will discuss the underlying purpose of
punitive damages. A capsule summary of the economics of punitive
damages is presented in Part II. Current state extraction statutes
are reviewed in Part III. Part IV discusses potential constitutional
issues related to state extraction statutes. Part V explains the
workings of a full statutory extraction statute and the problems
that may be encountered by such a system. This comment con-
cludes that full extraction of punitive damages is constitutional,
feasible, and if properly implemented, provides the same level of
deterrence and punishment as the current system of awarding pu-
nitive damages.
I. PURPOSE OF PUNITIVE DAMAGES
In Pacific Mutual Life Insurance Co. v. Haslip, e the United
States Supreme Court held that the purpose for awarding punitive
damages is not to compensate for injury, but rather to punish the
defendant and to deter others from engaging in similar conduct. 9
Virtually all legal scholars agree that punitive damage awards are
to punish and deter, not to compensate."0 However, some commen-
equally difficult to understand why, if the tortfeasor is to be punished by exemplary
damages, they should go to the compensated sufferer, and not to the public in whose
behalf he is punished.
Bass, 42 Wis. at 672.
15. The phrase "state extraction" as it relates to punitive damages was coined by
Professor James D. Ghiardi in Punitive Damages: State Extraction Practice Is Subject to
Eighth Amendment Limitations, 26 TORT & INS. L.J. 119 (1990).
16. See Part III below.
17. Id.
18. 111 S. Ct. 1032 (1991).
19. Haslip, 111 S. Ct. at 1044. Also see, International Bhd. of Elec. Workers v. Foust,
442 U.S. 42, 48 (1978) ("Punitive damages are not compensation for injury.") (quoting Gertz
v. Robert Welch, Inc.,. 418 U.S. 323, 350 (1974)). A majority of states that authorize puni-
tive damages have adopted the punishment and deterrence rationale. Sales & Cole, cited at
note 10, at 1126.
20. Robert D. Cooter, Punitive Damages for Deterrence: When and How Much?, 40
ALA. L. REv. 1143, 1146 (1986).
1994
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tators have also argued that punitive damages serve as compensa-
tion for injuries for which there is no redress.2'
In order to recover punitive damages,22 most jurisdictions re-
quire the plaintiff to prove and be awarded compensatory dam-
ages.23 Even in states where punitive damages are allowed as a
matter of common law, most states hold that there is no separate
cause of action for punitive damages.24 Therefore, to recover puni-
tive damages, a plaintiff must base his or her claim for punitive
damages on a legal theory which involves actual damages.2 5 How-
ever, a plaintiff may be awarded punitive damages for harm that is
likely to occur as a result of the defendant's conduct, even though
the plaintiff's actual damages are negligible.26
21. David G. Owen, Civil Punishment and the Public Good, 56 S. CAL. L. REV. 103,
112 (1982) ("The final goal [of punitive damages], compensation, including payment of the
victim's costs of litigation (including attorneys' fees), is the easiest objective to state in
terms of fairness in a scheme of punitive damages."); David L. Walther & Thomas A. Plein,
Punitive Damages: A Critical Analysis: Kink v. Combs, 49 MARQ. L. REV. 369, 381 (1965)
(Punitive damages serve to compensate the victim of a wrong for injuries that are not legally
cognizable.); but see, Sales & Cole, cited at note 10, at 1164 ("Compensatory awards cur-
rently provide recovery of all costs for physical injuries, disfigurement, physical impairment,
loss of earnings and earnings capacity, past and future medical expenses, past and future
pain and suffering, past and future mental anguish, loss of society and companionship, and
every conceivable intangible and imagined injury such as emotional distress and insult.")
Only Connecticut and Michigan consider the primary function of punitive damages as
compensation for the victim. See Waterbury Petroleum Prod., Inc. v. Canaan Oil & Fuel
Co., 477 A.2d 988, 1033 (Conn. 1984); Wise v. Daniel, 190 N.W. 746, 747 (Mich. 1922).
22. Punitive damages are defined as:
Damages on an increased scale, awarded to the plaintiff over and above what will
barely compensate him for his property loss, where the wrong done to him was aggra-
vated by circumstances of violence, oppression, malice, fraud, or wanton and wicked
conduct on the part of the defendant, and are intended to solace the plaintiff for
mental anguish, laceration of his feelings, shame, or else to punish the defendant for
his evil behavior or to make an example of him .
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 390 (6th ed. 1990).
23. James A. Breslo, Comment, Taking The Punitive Damage Windfall Away From
The Plaintiff: An Analysis, 86 Nw. U. L. REV. 1130, 1142 (1992).
Compensatory damages are awarded as "compensation, indemnity or reparation for the
loss or injury sustained by the injured party, so that he may be made whole and restored as
nearly as possible to the position or condition he was in prior to the injury." 25 C.J.S.,
Damages, § 3 (1966).
24. GHIARDI & KIRCHER, cited at note 13, § 6.16.
25. Id.
26. TXO Prod. Corp. v. Alliance Resources Corp., 419 S.E.2d 870, 909 (W.Va. 1992),
aff'd 113 S. Ct. 2711 (1993).
In TXO Production, the West Virginia Court of Appeals, in a unique decision, pushing
Haslip to the limit, reviewed punitive damages cases since the Haslip decision and broke
them down into three categories based on the defendant's conduct: 1) "really stupid defend-
ants" (reckless disregard); 2) "really mean defendants" (willful or malicious); and 3) "really
stupid defendants who could have caused a great deal of harm" though only minimal harm
304
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In addition to being awarded compensatory damages, most juris-
dictions require the plaintiff to show that the defendant's conduct
was intentional, willful, wanton, malicious, reckless or outrageous.
2 7
The extent of the plaintiff's injury is not a factor; rather, it is the
"character and nature of the defendant's conduct" that determines
whether punitive damages are justified.2 s
Some commentators believe that punitive damages should be re-
placed with what are known as aggravated damages. 29 An award of
aggravated damages compensates the plaintiff for his or her physi-
cal and mental suffering, but is not intended to be a form of pun-
ishment for the defendant's egregious conduct.3 ° Most jurisdic-
tions, however, already allow compensation for emotional and
mental suffering, as Well as for the injuries of insult, fear, and hu-
miliation.3  Therefore, aggravated damages would result in
overcompensating the plaintiff, just as punitive damages provide
the plaintiff with a windfall.
Finally, some proponents of abolishing punitive damages argue
that civil remedies are to compensate for injury, not punish or de-
ter wrongful conduct.3 2 These commentators believe the criminal
law better serves the roles of punishment and deterrence than does
the civil law. The basis of this argument is that society has no
interest in the enforcement of an individual's civil or private
resulted. 419 S.E.2d at 888. For really stupid defendants, punitive damages should be no
more than five times the compensatory damages. Id. at 889. For really mean defendants,
punitive damages of 500 times compensatory damages is not violative of due process. Id.
Upon appeal, the United States Supreme Court did not embrace the ratios set forth by
the West Virginia court, but instead stated that it is the harm that was actually caused or
could have been caused by the defendant's conduct that is the determining factor. TXO
Prod. Corp. v. Alliance Resources Corp., 113 S. Ct. 2711, 2721 (1993).
27. Owen, cited at note 21, at 114-15; also see, Sales & Cole, cited at note 10, at 1130.
28. GHIARDI & KIRc HER, cited at note 13, § 5.01.
29. "'Aggravated damages are damages which take into account the additional harm
caused to the plaintiff's feelings by such reprehensible or outrageous conduct on the part of
the defendant.'" Breslo, cited at note 23, at 1138 n.37 (quoting Walker v. CFTO Ltd., 59
O.R.2d 104, 111 (C.A. 1987)).
30. Zitzer, cited at note 10, at 677-78 nn.112-17 (discussing Rookes v. Barnard, 1 All
E.R. 367, 407 (1964) (aggravated damages are to compensate the plaintiff, not punish the
defendant).
31. Sales & Cole, cited at note 10, at 1122.
32. See, e.g., W. PAGE KEETON, ET. AL., PROSSER & KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 2,
at 7 (5th ed. 1984); David G. Owen, Deterrence and Desert in Tort: A Comment, 73 CALIF.
L. REV. 665, 666 (1985); Gregory A. Williams, Note, Tuttle v. Raymond: An Excessive Re-
striction Upon Punitive Damages Awards in Motor Vehicle Tort Cases Involving Reckless
Conduct, 48 OHIo ST. L.J. 551, 556 n.46 (1987) [hereinafter Note, Tuttle v. Raymond];
Zitzer, cited at note 10, at 673. But see, Owen, cited at note 21, at 112.
33. See e.g., Zitzer, cited at note 10.
1994 305
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rights; only the state has the authority to punish a person for
wrongful conduct.3 This proposition is inherently incorrect be-
cause it assumes that society does not care about the individual's
rights even though that individual is a member of society.35 Fur-
ther, this argument ignores the fact that many wrongful acts will
not or cannot be punished in a criminal proceeding. 6
Nevertheless, where a plaintiff recovers compensatory damages
for the harm he or she suffered and also recovers punitive dam-
ages, the plaintiff is overcompensated, and, thus, receives a wind-
fall. 7 Paying punitive damages awards to the state takes this
windfall away from the plaintiff. However, some form of economic
incentive is needed to ensure that the plaintiff brings and prose-
cutes a claim for punitive damages even if the plaintiff is not the
beneficiary of the punitive damage award.
II. THE ECONOMICS OF PUNITIVE DAMAGES
Many commentators have attempted to explain punitive dam-
ages in terms of economic theory.3 8 Keeping in mind the purpose
of punitive damages (deterrence and punishment), a simple eco-
nomic analysis provides a sound basis for analyzing punitive dam-
34. Id. at 674.
35. It should be noted that some proponents of this argument believe that since crim-
inal law better serves society, any punitive damage award should be paid to the state (soci-
ety) and not the individual. Andrew M. Kenefick, Note, The Constitutionality of Punitive
Damages Under the Excessive Fines Clause of the Eighth Amendment, 85 MICH. L. REV.
1699, 1704 (1987) (stating that criminal fines are paid for the benefit of society).
Other critics argue that punitive damages should be abolished or all procedural safeguards
of criminal law should be afforded the punitive damages defendant. See, e.g., Grass, cited at
note 10, at 269; Wheeler, cited at note 10, at 322-51; Note, The Imposition of Punishment
by Civil Courts: A Reappraisal of Punitive Damages, 41 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1158, 1180-81
(1966).
36. GHIARDI & KIRCHER, cited at note 13, § 2.02; Lisa M. Broman, Comment, Puni-
tive Damages: An Appeal for Deterrence, 61 NEB. L. REV. 651, 654 (1982) (the state cannot
prosecute all wrongful conduct). Punitive damages are often considered a complete substi-
tute for the criminal law for actions involving libel and slander, trespass, and technical bat-
teries. Note, Tuttle v. Raymond, cited at note 32, at 557.
37. See note 6.
38. See, e.g., David D. Haddock, et al., An Ordinary Economic Rationale for Ex-
traordinary Legal Sanctions, 78 CAL. L. REV. 1 (1990); Cooter, cited at note 20; Thomas C.
Galligan, Jr., Augmented Awards: The Efficient Evolution of Punitive Damages, 51 LA. L.
REV. 3 (1990); Robert D. Cooter, Economic Analysis of Punitive Damages, 56 S. CAL. L. REV.
79 (1982).
"[Tihe practices and law governing private adjudication appear to be strongly influenced
by economic considerations and explicable in economic terms, is evidence that economic
theory has a major role to play in explaining fundamental features of the legal system."




ages for purposes of this comment.3 9
The "extraordinary sanctions model" provides the economic ex-
planation for punitive damages in cases where the defendant inten-
tionally harmed the plaintiff or the plaintiff's property. 0 Such in-
tentional conduct is the type that society seeks to abolish.
41
Compensatory damages will not be enough to deter the defendant's
intentional conduct because the defendant, absent punitive dam-
ages, will retain the profits that resulted from the tortious
conduct.42
In theory, a tortfeasor will evaluate the costs of undertaking a
particular action against the benefits to be derived by taking that
action. Where the tortfeasor believes the costs of undertaking this
action, including compensatory damages for injury to the plaintiff,
are less than the benefits from doing the activity, then the
tortfeasor will proceed to do the activity. On the other hand, if the
costs to the tortfeasor are higher than the benefits, the tortfeasor
will not take the action that results in injury to the plaintiff.4" As-
suming the tortfeasor does act and the plaintiff is harmed as a re-
39. The "standard tort model" is often used to explain how compensatory damages
create efficiency in negligence situations. Amelia J. Toy, Comment, Statutory Punitive
Damage Caps and the Profit Motive: An Economic Perspective, 40 EMORY L.J. 303, 305
(1991). Under the standard tort model, a potential tortfeasor will evaluate the accident costs
of undertaking a particular action against the benefits derived by taking that action. Id. If
the tortfeasor believes the costs of the action, including compensatory damages for injury to
the plaintiff, are less than the benefits from doing the activity, then the tortfeasor will pro-
ceed to do the activity. If, on the other hand, the accident costs to the tortfeasor are higher
than the benefits, the tortfeasor will not take the action that results in injury to the plain-
tiff. Haddock, cited at note 38, at 8.
For a detailed explanation and applications of the standard tort model, see generally,
Cooter, cited at note 20.
40. Toy, cited at note 39, at 307. The extraordinary sanctions model was first formu-
lated in Haddock, cited at note 38.
41. Haddock, cited at note 38, at 13.
42. Id. at 6.
43. For example, assume that D manufactures 100 widgets per year. D can prevent 10
serious injuries per year by installing a $10 safety device on each widget. If D does not, D
can expect to pay $50 in compensatory damages per injury. Thus, with no safety device D
would pay $500 to P; but D would pay $1000 to install the safety device on all the widgets
he manufactures. From an economic stand point, D would not install the safety device.
However, if punitive damages can be awarded against D because D intentionally manufac-
tured and marketed an unsafe product, D will now have the incentive to install the safety
device. This, of course, assumes that the aggregate punitive damage awards per year are
more than $500.
Therefore, to be economically efficient, an award of punitive damages to any plaintiff
must be greater than $10-the cost of the safety device. But note that punitive damages
become economically inefficient from society's point of view if the aggregate of all punitive
damage awards does not exceed $500.
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sult, the plaintiff will be compensated and the tortfeasor's costs
will reflect the cost of the harm to the plaintiff.44
The defendant will be able to estimate the costs of his or her.
actions prior to undertaking the action where punitive damages
may be imposed. The defendant knows that not only will compen-
sation be required, but where punitive damages can be awarded,
the defendant will risk losing all profits gained as a result of his or
her actions.4" The result is that the defendant is punished for en-
gaging in wrongful conduct, and conduct that society condones is
more likely to be deterred. This will only be true, however, if the
punitive damages awarded are greater than the profits the defend-
ant expected to earn.4"
It does not, however, necessarily follow that the plaintiff should
be the beneficiary of the punitive damage award. An award of com-
pensatory damages returns the plaintiff to the position he or she
was in prior to the defendant's wrongful conduct.47 Giving the
plaintiff an award of punitive damages, in addition to the compen-
satory damages, rewards the plaintiff for being a victim of a tort
irrespective of the punishment value of the punitive damages.
In summary, punitive damages operate to deter conduct that so-
ciety wishes to abolish. A court needs to set the punitive damage
award high enough to efficiently achieve this goal. Further, just as
the defendant should not be allowed to profit from his or her
wrongful conduct, neither should the plaintiff be allowed to profit
from the defendant's wrongful conduct.4 8 Some states have taken
steps in the direction of taking the profit of punitive damages away
from the plaintiff by enacting some form of extraction statute.
III. STATES THAT TAKE PART OF THE PUNITIVE DAMAGES AWAY
As stated above, a few states have enacted statutes that take
part of a punitive damage award away from the plaintiff. These
state statutes extract only a portion of a punitive damage award.
Even if unstated, the justification for allowing the plaintiff a por-
tion of a punitive damage award is that the plaintiff must have an
44. For simplification the transaction costs have been ignored. The transaction costs
would be the legal fees and litigation costs paid by each party.
45. Toy, cited at note 39, at 312.
46. Id.
47. See note 23.
48. Some states achieve this by capping punitive damages; but capping punitive dam-
ages at an arbitrary level would result in under deterring conduct that is condoned by soci-
ety. Toy, cited at note 39, at 304.
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incentive to seek punitive damages.
Florida, by statute, is entitled to thirty-five percent of any puni-
tive damage award."9 The state deposits its portion in the general
revenue fund.50 If the cause of action is for personal injury or
wrongful death, payment is made to the "Public Medical Assistant
Trust Fund."51 The plaintiff's attorney's fees are to be based on
and paid from the sixty-five percent the plaintiff receives.2 If the
parties settle after the trial and verdict, the state is entitled to
thirty-five percent of the amount of the settlement that represents
punitive damages.5
In an effort to reduce requests for punitive damages, Illinois
gives the trial judge discretion to apportion any punitive damage
award between the plaintiff, the plaintiff's attorney and the state
Department of Rehabilitative Services." The attorney's share is
determined by what is reasonable, but the judge cannot award an
amount that exceeds the attorney-client fee arrangement.5 5 The
plaintiff's share is determined by whether the defendant owed a
special duty to the plaintiff.
56
Utah, after the payment of attorney fees, requires fifty percent
of a punitive damage award over the amount of $20,000 to be paid
to the state's general fund.57 Oregon also requires that fifty percent
of a punitive damage award be paid to the state's "Criminal Inju-
ries Compensation Account."58 Oregon becomes a judgment credi-
tor as to the punitive damages upon entry of a judgment for puni-
tive damages. 9
If the defendant's conduct was not specifically directed at the
plaintiff, Iowa takes seventy-five percent of a punitive damage
49. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 768.73(2) (West 1992 & Supp. 1993). Florida also imposes a cap
on punitive damage awards of three times the amount of compensatory damages awarded to
the claimant. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 768.73(1).
50. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 768.73(2).
51. Id.
52. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 768.73(7).
53. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 768.73(4).
54. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 735 para. 5/2-1207 (Smith-Hurd 1992).
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-18-1(3) (1989). Except for driving while intoxicated and
driving while under the influence of drugs, punitive damages may only be awarded if com-
pensatory damages are awarded and the plaintiff proves by clear and convincing evidence
that the defendant acted willfully and maliciously, or intentionally, fraudulently or with
knowledge and reckless indifference toward others. UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-18-1(1).
58. OR. REV. STAT. § 18.540 (1991).
59. OR. REV. STAT. § 18.540(1).
1994
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award after deducting* attorney fees and litigation costs. 0 The
state's portion is paid to the "Civil Reparations Trust" that was
established for the benefit of indigent civil litigation or insurance
assistance."
In Missouri, the plaintiff keeps fifty percent of a punitive dam-
age award and the remainder, less attorney fees, is paid to the
"Tort Victims Compensation Fund. 62 The state may execute upon
the judgment or enter into a settlement with the defendant,6" but
Missouri has no interest in or right to intervene on its own behalf
in lawsuits." ' The Missouri Legislature believed that punitive dam-
age awards overcompensate the plaintiff, but to ensure that plain-
tiffs continue to pursue punitive damages, the legislature decided
that an economic incentive was needed.
6 5
Critics contend that states with statutory extraction and states
that have capped punitive damage awards require a plaintiff to
"seriously evaluate whether a punitive damage claim may ad-
versely impact the compensatory damages awarded by the trier of
fact "6 If this is true, however, the problem is not with the pay-
ment of punitive damages to the state, but with the jury's method
of arriving at the compensatory damages. The jury instruction may
fail to adequately explain the purpose of compensatory damages,
or juries may not give plaintiffs adequate compensatory damages
because the juries believe that the plaintiff's punitive damages will
make up for any shortfall. In such a case, the punitive damages are
compensation to the plaintiff and that is not the function of puni-
tive damages.6 A clear explanation, within the jury instruction, of
the function of compensatory damages and the function of puni-
tive damages would alleviate this problem. 8
Given that punitive damages are economically justified and that
60. IOWA CODE ANN. § 668A.1(2)(b) (West 1992). To be awarded punitive damages,
Iowa requires the plaintiff to prove by clear and convincing evidence that the defendant's
conduct was a willful and wanton disregard for the rights or safety of another. IowA CODE
ANN. § 668A.1(1)(a).
61. IOwA CODE ANN. § 668A.1(2)(b).
62. Mo. REV. STAT. § 537.675(2) (1988).
63. Id.
64. Mo. REV. STAT. § 537.675(3).
65. W. Dudley McCarther & Robert L. Jackstadt, Punitive Damages: Malice and
Other Recent Developments, 43 J. Mo. B. 455, 462 (1987).
66. James D. Ghiardi, Punitive Damages-Legislative Reform, 39 FED'N. INS. & CORP.
COUNS. Q. 189, 197 (1989).
67. This is not to say that punitive damages should be capped or eliminated in an
effort to make compensatory damages function properly. See note 48.
68. See notes 133-44 and accompanying text.
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a few states have implemented extraction statutes, the question re-
mains as to whether punitive damages extraction statutes are con-
stitutionally valid.
IV. THE CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITS OF STATUTORY EXTRACTION
Regardless of whether a state imposes statutory extraction of
punitive damages or follows the common law, the United States
Constitution and its limitations and protections must be consid-
ered. There are four main constitutional challenges that must be
overcome before a state may implement statutory extraction of pu-
nitive damages: (1) double jeopardy, (2) due process, (3) excessive
fines, and (4) the taking of property without just compensation.
A. Double Jeopardy
Some critics argue that a defendant found guilty of a criminal
offense and held liable for punitive damages is subject to double
punishment 9 in violation of the Fifth Amendment prohibition
against double jeopardy.70 However, the Supreme Court has held
that the Double Jeopardy Clause only applies where the defendant
is subject to two criminal punishments. 71 The double jeopardy pro-
hibition applies-to proceedings that are "essentially criminal. '7 1 In
determining whether a proceeding is "essentially criminal," the
purpose of the proceeding, the consequences and the extent that
state resources were used to bring and prosecute the action are
considered.73 Punitive damages awarded in a private action are not
"essentially criminal" because state resources are not expended to
institute or prosecute the claim.7
Further, the Double Jeopardy Clause should not create a greater
69. Beckman, cited at note 10, at 251-53.
70. U.S. CONST. amend. V guarantees that no person shall "be subject for the same
offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life and limb". Id.
71. United States v. Halper, 490 U.S. 435, 451 (1989); Helvering v. Mitchell, 303 U.S.
391, 399 (1938).
72. Breed v. Janes, 421 U.S. 519, 528 (1975).
•73. Breed, 421 U.S. at 529.
74. Hansen v. Johns-Manville Prod. Corp., 734 F.2d 1036, 1042 (5th Cir. 1984) (hold-
ing actions not brought by the state do not subject the defendant to double jeopardy).
States that allow the plaintiff to keep all of or a portion of the punitive damage award are
arguably using state resources to prosecute the claim against the defendant. In this respect,
the plaintiff is given society's resources as an incentive to prosecute the claim. Under full
statutory extraction, however, the plaintiff is not prosecuting the claim. It is society that is
prosecuting the claim against the defendant with plaintiff's attorney acting on behalf of




risk of unconstitutionality for statutory extraction than it does for
the common law method of imposing punitive damages so long as
the state is not prosecuting both the civil and criminal actions.
Statutory extraction merely alters the party that receives the puni-
tive damage award.
B. Due Process
The Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments prohibit federal or state
governments from denying a person due process of law.75 Due pro-
cess applies to both criminal and civil proceedings by requiring a
definitive standard that notifies individuals of what constitutes
punishable conduct 76 and by requiring a fundamentally fair
procedure.
71
Some commentators argue that the procedures used to impose
punitive damages lack the fundamental fairness required by due
process.78 However, the Supreme Court has stated that the com-
mon law method of assessing punitive damages does not violate the
Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause.7" There will be no vi-
olation of due process, even if the jury has significant discretion in
awarding punitive damages, so long as the jury understands that
the purpose of punitive damages is to punish and deter, 0 the jury
75. The Fifth Amendment provides that no person shall "be deprived of life, liberty
or property, without due process of law." U.S. CONST. amend. V.
The Fourteenth Amendment prohibits a state from "depriving any person-of life, liberty,
and property without due process of law." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
Procedural due process requires that a party whose rights are to be affected by a proceed-
ing be given notice and an opportunity to be heard by an unbiased decisionmaker. Fuentes
v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 80 (1977). Substantive due process, on the other hand requires "legis-
lation to be fair and reasonable in content as well as application." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY
1429 (6th ed. 1990). Both procedural and substantive due process are guaranteed by the
Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments.
76. Dorsey D. Ellis, Jr., Punitive Damages, Due Process, and the Jury, 40 ALA. L.
REV. 975, 990 (1989).
77. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 333 (1976). A civil action for punitive dam-
ages requires the application of due process because any use of the courts to compel a de-
fendant to relinquish property constitutes state action. See, e.g., Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S.
67 (1977); North Ga. Finishing, Inc. v. Di-Chem, Inc., 419 U.S. 601 (1975); Sniadach v. Fam-
ily Fin. Corp., 395 U.S. 337 (1969).
78. Ellis, cited at note 76, at 990. In addition commentators often argue that since
punitive damages and criminal fines serve the same function of punishment and deterrence,
criminal procedural safeguards guaranteed by the Fourth, Fifth, Sixth and Eight Amend-
ments should apply to cases where punitive damages are demanded. See, e.g., Beckman,
cited at note 10; Grass, cited at note 10; Wheeler, cited at note 10; Comment, Criminal
Safeguards and the Punitive Damage Defendant, 34 U. CHI. L. REV. 408 (1967).
79. Pacific Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1, 28 (1991).
80. Haslip, 499 U.S. at 29.
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is impartial, the award is based on the evidence and arguments
presented to the jury, and the award is reviewed and upheld by the
trial judge as reasonable." If these things are done, the procedures
for imposing punitive damages will not violate the Due Process
Clause.
Due process will, however, be violated where there is state action
and the law is not rationally related to a legitimate state objec-
tive.82 The rational basis test is applied where a fundamental right
is not involved.8 3 An award of punitive damages is not a fundamen-
tal right guaranteed under the Constitution.84 Where a jury award
of punitive damages is found to be state action, then all jury deter-
minations would necessarily have to be considered state action.85
When judges exercise their discretion in interpreting the common
law, appellate courts will only reverse upon a showing of abuse of
discretion. It would be difficult to reconcile why a jury's exercise
of its discretion is subject to state action due process claims while
a judge, who is an officer of the state, is not subject to state action
due process claims when the judge exercises his or her discretion. 7
Where a state codifies the common law standards for punitive
damages, it must be careful to sufficiently define the standards to
avoid attack as violative of substantive due process. A law will be
struck down as being violative of due process if it is vague.88 The
void-for-vagueness doctrine has been applied in civil proceedings
as well as criminal proceedings.8 9 Where a defendant has attacked
a punitive damage statute, however, the courts have rejected the
81. TXO Prod. Corp. v. Alliance Resources Corp., 113 S. Ct. 2711, 2719-20 (1993). If
fair procedures are followed, there is a strong, if not irrebuttable, presumption that the
process is valid. TXO Prod., 113 S. Ct. at 2720.
82. Nebbia v. N.Y., 291 U.S. 502, 525 (1934).
83. Moore v. City of E. Cleveland, 431 U.S. 547-50 (1977) (White, J., dissenting) (ex-
plaining the three levels of judicial scrutiny used by the Court for due process analysis).
84. In TXO Production, the Court, however, rejected Alliance's argument that the
rational basis test should be applied to punitive damages awards. TXO Prod., 113 S. Ct. at
2720. The conclusion is that an award of punitive damages is not a right guaranteed under
the Constitution. Nevertheless, an award of punitive damages can be unconstitutional if it is
not reasonable in relation to the defendant's conduct. Id. at 2721.
85. Paul J. Zwier, Comment, Due Process and Punitive Damages, 1991 UTAH L. REV.
407, 415 (1991) [hereinafter, Comment, Due Process].
86. Comment, Due Process, cited at note 85, at 415-416.
87. Id. at 416. However, a judge's exercise of discretion is reviewable by the appellate
courts.
88. A law is considered void for vagueness if persons "of common intelligence must
necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application .... Connally v. General
Constr. Co., 269 U.S. 385, 391 (1926).
89. GHIARDI & KIRCHER, cited at note 13, § 3.03.
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void-for-vagueness argument by finding sufficient standards.9 0 To
pass muster, the standard established within the state, whether by
the state's courts or its legislature, must articulate the standards of
conduct necessary for the imposition of punitive damages91 and no-
tify people as to what conduct is punishable.2
In the end, statutory extraction statutes face no greater risk of
being unconstitutional on due process grounds than does the com-
mon law method of awarding punitive damages because both face
the same issues as to vagueness and fundamental fairness. Further,
both remain constitutional only by clearly defining the conduct
that is subject to punitive damages and ensuring that a fair proce-
dure is followed.
C. The Excessive Fines Clause
The Eighth Amendment provides in pertinent part: "[N]or
[shall] excessive fines [be] imposed."93 Commentators have argued
that the history of the Eighth Amendment indicates that it applies
to both criminal fines and civil punishment. 4
In Browning-Ferris Industries of Vermont, Inc. v. Kelco Dispo-
sal, Inc.,5 the Supreme Court rejected this argument and held that
the Eighth Amendment cannot be used to challenge an award of
punitive damages.96 The Court determined that the Eighth
Amendment meaning of "fine" did not include civil damages.
9 7
90. Id.
91. More than mere negligence is required before punitive damages will be assessed;
"the defendant's conduct must be aggravated or outrageous, or characterized by some posi-
tive element of conscious wrongdoing." Sales & Cole, cited at note 10, at 1130.
Professor Owen suggests that words such as "deliberate," "conscious," "reckless," and
"wilful and wanton" are vague to the average lay person. Owen, cited at note 21, at 115.
However, words such as "outrageous," malicious," "flagrant disregard," and "extreme depar-
ture" are accurate in describing a defendant's conduct that is outside the societal norm. Id.
92. TXO Prod., 113 S. Ct. at 2724 (stating that "the notice component of the Due
Process Clause is satisfied if prior law fairly indicates that a punitive damages award might
be imposed in response to egregiously tortious conduct." Id.).
93. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
94. Browning-Ferris Indus. of Vermont, Inc. v. Kelco Disposal, Inc., 492 U.S. 257, 287
(1989) (O'Connor, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part); see also, Ghiardi, cited at note
15; Massey, cited at note 10; Kenefick, cited at note 35.
95. 492 U.S. 251 (1989).
96. Browning-Ferris, 492 U.S. at 263-264.
97. Id. at 265-66. The Court stated that a "fine was understood to mean a payment to
a sovereign as punishment for some [criminal] offense" and was "not concern[ed] with the
extent or purpose of civil damages." Id. The Court went on to say that "[tihe fact that
punitive damages are imposed through the aegis of courts and serve to advance governmen-
tal interests is insufficient to support" the argument that the Eighth Amendment applies to
private actions. Id. at 275.
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The Supreme Court stated, however, that punitive damages do not
violate the Eighth Amendment where the state neither prosecutes
the claim nor "has any right to recover a share of the damage
awards."98 Hence, the Court left unanswered questions of whether
the Excessive Fines Clause applies in cases where punitive dam-
ages are paid directly to the state as a result of a private civil ac-
tion,99 or where the civil damages are used to raise revenue.100
One federal district court has held that the Excessive Fines
Clause applied to a state extraction of punitive damages.0 1 How-
ever, rather than justify this conclusion on substantive law, the
court justified its holding based only on the question left open by
the United States Supreme Court in Browning-Ferris.
1 0 2
D. The Takings Clause
The Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment, as applied to the
states through the Fourteenth Amendment, prohibits the taking of
private property for a public use without the payment of just com-
pensation.103 It can be argued that where a state receives a portion
of a punitive damage award, the plaintiff's property is taken.
The Colorado Supreme Court has held that the plaintiff has a
property interest in an award of punitive damages."" In Kirk v.
Denver Publishing Co., the court held that after a judgment is en-
tered, the plaintiff has a vested right to satisfaction out of the per-
sonal and real property of the judgment debtor.10 5 Further, where a
private property interest is created as a result of a final judgment,
the state legislature cannot diminish that interest by statute.106
98. Id. at 264.
99. Id. at 276 n.21.
100. Id. at 275.
101. McBride v. General Motors Corp., 737 F. Supp. 1563 (M.D. Ga. 1990). The dis-
trict court stated that "there can be no legitimate purpose for a state to involve itself in the
area of civil damage litigation between private parties wherein punitive damages are a legiti-
mate item of recovery, where the State, through the legislative process, preempts for itself a
share of the award." Id. at 1579.
102. See notes 95-100 and accompanying text.
103. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
104. Kirk v. Denver Publishing Co., 818 P.2d 262, 269 (Colo. 1991).
105. Kirk, 818 P.2d at 269.
106. Id. at 268 (citing McCullough v. Virginia, 172 U.S. 102, 123-24 (1898)). The court
held that:
[Florcing a judgment creditor to pay the state general fund one-third of a judgment
for exemplary damages . . . without conferring on the judgment creditor any benefit
or service not furnished to other civil litigants not required to make the same contri-
bution[ ] amounts to an unconstitutional taking of the judgment creditor's property
in violation of the Takings Clause. . ..
1994
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The Colorado statute specifically required the plaintiff to pay one-
third of the punitive damage award to the state, but the statute
specifically disclaimed an interest until payment of the state share
became due."0 7
The Florida Supreme Court reached the opposite result in
Gordon v. Florida.'"° The Florida court held that there is no prop-
erty right in punitive damages. 09 In Gordon, the court stated that
punitive damage awards are not meant to be compensation to the
plaintiff, but are based on public policy considerations, and as
such, the legislature has plenary authority to place whatever condi-
tions it deems appropriate on the award of punitive damages." 0
The court held that no taking occurs when the state receives a por-
tion of the punitive damage award because it achieves a legitimate
public purpose."'
It is possible to avoid the result reached by the Colorado Su-
preme Court by requiring the defendant to pay the state's portion
of a punitive damage award directly to the clerk of courts rather
than to the plaintiff. The result is that the plaintiff has no interest
in the punitive damage award and, hence, no property interest."2
The Florida court's holding that punitive damages are not a matter
of inherent right is in accord with the majority of commentators."'
In addition, the court's holding is logically supported by the fact
that punitive damages are awarded for the benefit of society. 14 A
plaintiff cannot possibly have a property right in something where
there is discretion in whether the plaintiff should receive it.
V. FULL STATUTORY EXTRACTION
Although similar to the states that require a portion of punitive
damages be paid to the state, full statutory extraction would re-
quire payment to the state of the entire punitive damage award,
Kirk, 818 P.2d at 272.
107. COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-21-102 (West 1989).
108. 608 So.2d 800 (Fla. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 1647 (1993).
109. Gordon, 608 So.2d at 801.
110. Id.
111. Id. at 802. See also, Allstate Ins. Co. v. A.M. Pugh Assoc., 604 F. Supp. 85 (M.D.
Pa. 1984); American Bank & Trust Co. v. Community Hosp., 683 P.2d 670, 676 (Cal. 1984);
Samsel v. Wheeler Transp. Serv., 789 P.2d 541, 555 (Kan. 1990).
112. But see, McBride v. General Motors Corp., 737 F. Supp. 1563, 1579 (M.D. Ga.
1990).
113. See, e.g., KEETON ET. AL., cited at note 32, § 2, at 14 ("It is generally agreed that
punitive damages are. . . not a matter of right and that it is always with in the discretion of
the jury or trial judge to withhold them." Id.).
114. See note 19.
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less the plaintiff's litigation costs and reasonable attorney fees.' 15
Implementing such a scheme is a form of tort reform. Although
one benefit of full statutory extraction is that fewer marginal suits
seeking punitive damages will be brought, this is not, however, the
main purpose of the plan."6 The purpose of full statutory extrac-
tion is three-fold: (1) to take the windfall of punitive damages
away from the plaintiff; (2) to maintain the level of punishment
and deterrence provided by punitive damage awards; and (3) to
provide a means to compensate -plaintiffs who cannot have their
compensatory judgments satisfied.
This section describes some of the aspects that a state will need
to consider prior to enacting full statutory extraction. Part A cov-
ers the first issue that must be settled: where the punitive damages
award would go. Pleading punitive damages is discussed in Part B.
Part C discusses the function of the jury. Part D describes how an
incentive is provided to the plaintiff and the payment of attorney
fees. Part E discusses the impact of statutory extraction on the
settlement process.
A. The Tort Victims' Compensation Fund
Upon judgment and satisfaction, the state would deposit the
award of punitive damages into a specially created "Tort Victims'
Compensation Fund."'" 7 The primary purpose of the compensation
fund is to provide compensation to plaintiffs who could not have
their compensatory judgments satisfied because of the defendant's
insolvency." 8 Where the defendant is insolvent, the plaintiff would
115. Statutory extraction should not be used to limit the size of punitive damage
awards since placing caps on such awards would result in underdeterring egregious conduct.
However, to avoid excessive fines issues, such caps or fixed ratios may need to be estab-
lished. See notes 123-24 and accompanying text.
116. However, it may be that where full statutory extraction is in effect, more litiga-
tion may be instituted by plaintiffs who know that they cannot collect a compensatory dam-
age award from insolvent defendants, but can nevertheless recover from the compensatory
fund. See note 118 and accompanying text.
117. The Tort Victims' Compensation Fund postulated is similar to that established
by Missouri. Mo. REV. STAT. § 537.675(2) (1988).
118. The question that arises is whether the victims' compensation fund would have
enough money to carry out its purpose. If the critics that charge that punitive damages
awards are increasing in frequency and amount are correct, then the compensation fund will
be fully funded. See, e.g., Sales & Cole, cited at note 10, at 1154. However, if the proponents
of punitive damages are correct, the compensation fund will be under funded. See e.g., Dan-
iels & Martin, cited at note 9, at 43.
It is interesting to note that both sides to this argument have cited the same study per-
formed by the Rand Corporation Institute for Civil Justice. See Daniels & Martin, cited at
note 9, at 24-27 (discussing TORT POLICY WORKING GROUP, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF
1994
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apply to the fund to receive payment to cover the uncollectible
portion of its compensatory judgment. In setting up the compensa-
tion fund, the state should limit claims against the fund to natural
persons who suffered tort injuries.119
Paying the punitive damage award to the compensation fund
would serve the public purpose more so than allowing the plaintiff
to keep the entire award or any portion of it.'2 0 In a sense, award-
ing punitive damages to the state is compensation to society for
the harm inflicted by the defendant.' The compensation fund is
JUSTICE, 39-42 (1986) (punitive damages are increasing in size and frequency); SPECIAL COM-
MIrrEE ON PUNITIVE DAMAGES, SECTION OF LITIGATION, AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, PUNITIVE
DAMAGES: A CONSTRUCTIVE EXAMINATION 17-18 (1986) (except for intentional torts, punitive
damages are neither awarded frequently nor in excessive amounts)). For a more current and
more comprehensive survey and analysis, see Daniels & Martin, cited at note 9. See also,
Justice Janie L. Shores, A Suggestion for Limited Tort Reform: Allocation of Punitive
Damage Awards to Eliminate Windfalls, 44 ALA. L. REV. 61, 82-84 (1992) (citing Milo Geye-
lin, Product Suits Yield Few Punitive Awards, WALL ST. J., Jan. 6, 1992, at B1 (summariz-
ing a study of punitive damages in products liability cases released by the Roscoe Pound
Foundation)).
119. Corporations, partnerships, associations and the like, would be excluded from re-
covery from the fund even though their injuries may be just as severe as a natural person's
injury. Statutory extraction can be likened to state-provided benefits. As with welfare bene-
fits, only natural persons should be allowed to collect them.
In so limiting who may collect from the compensation fund, the state may violate the
Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause. However, since the rational basis test is
applied, a state may justify such a limitation as being rationally related to a legitimate state
interest: protecting natural individuals from the effects of harmful conduct beyond their
control. See generally, McBride v. General Motors Corp., 737 F. Supp. 1563, 1576 (M.D. Ga.
1990) (holding that the Georgia statutory extraction scheme violated equal protection be-
cause it discriminates against individual plaintiffs for which such discrimination is not ra-
tionally related to a legitimate state interest):
Likewise, persons unable to collect contract action judgments should be prohibited from
recovering from the compensation fund. Generally, the recovery of damages in actions aris-
ing out of contract are limited to those losses that are within the contemplation of the par-
ties at the time the contract was formed. Hadley v. Baxendale, 156 Eng. Rep. 145 (1854). As
a general rule, punitive damages are not recoverable in actions based on breach of contract
unless the breach supports an independent action in tort. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
CONTRACTS § 355 (1981) (punitive damages not recoverable for breach of contract); Id. at
§ 344(a) (damages may not exceed the expected benefit of the bargain). It would be unfair
to allow the victim of a contract action to recover an uncollectible judgment from the com-
pensation fund because contract actions alone never produce punitive damages. Further, the
insolvency of a party to a contract is one of the risks taken by the other party when entering
an arm's length transaction. Tort victims do not have the opportunity to enter into a free
bargain with the wrongdoer.
120. Regardless of whether the punitive damage award is paid to the plaintiff or to the
compensation fund, the public purpose of punishing and deterring conduct which society
condones is served; but payment of the punitive damage award to the state serves the added
public purpose of preventing hardship to some members of society.
121. Dorsey D. Ellis, Jr., Fairness and Efficiency in the Law of Punitive Damages, 56
S. CAL. L. REV. 1, 29 (1982) (compensatory damages paid to the plaintiff alone do not pro-
rationally related to a legitimate legislative purpose: preventing
some members of the public from bearing the full cost of injuries
resulting from another's egregious conduct.
Without the compensation fund, a tort victim must rely on pub-
lic support in the form of welfare or Medicaid if the victim cannot
recover compensatory damages because of the defendant's insol-
vency and the victim's medical or accident bills drive the victim to
insolvency. To this end, the compensation fund would help relieve
the state's citizens of the tax burden of supporting such a tort
victim.
1 2
A state with full statutory extraction may run the risk that the
statute violates the Eighth Amendment Excessive Fines Clause. 2 '
If the Excessive Fines Clause does apply, a state may have to im-
pose a cap or a fixed ratio on awards of punitive damages, 12 4 and
ensure that amounts received are earmarked for purposes other
than general revenue.
B. Pleading and Proving Punitive Damages
With statutory extraction, the plaintiff must still make a de-
mand for punitive damages '25 and prove the defendant's conduct
was oppressive, malicious, intentional, willful and wanton, reckless,
or outrageous. The finder of fact would award punitive damages as
it has always done, based on the severity of the defendant's con-
duct and the defendant's character. 12
6
vide a remedy for societal losses).
122. Where subrogation is allowed, the compensation fund would also help to hold
down the cost of insurance premiums provided the insurer would*be allowed to seek reim-
bursement for actual expenses it had paid on behalf of the plaintiff.
123. See McBride, 737 F. Supp at 1578 (where the state receives a share of the puni-
tive damages, the Excessive Fines Clause is implicated); see also notes 93-102 and accompa-
nying text.
124. However, in TXO Production, the Supreme Court held that it is the defendant's
conduct that is determinative and not the "dramatic disparity between the actual damages
and the punitive damages." TXO Prod., 113 S. Ct. at 2722.
Further, statutory caps or ratio limits on punitive damages could result in underdeter-
rence of such conduct. See notes 40-48 and accompanying text.
125. See the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure which require that pleadings setting
forth a claim for relief shall contain, inter alia, "demand for judgment for the relief the
pleader seeks." FED. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(3).
126. Many jurisdictions allow the jury to consider the defendant's wealth when deter-
mining the size of the punitive damage award. See, e.g., Curtis Roggow, Note, Punitive
Damages-Evidence of Defendant's Financial Condition Is Admissible to Determine the
Amount of Punitive Damages to be Awarded Against the Defendant, 27 DRAKE L. REV. 584,
586 (1977-78). The rationale for this rule is that deterrence will not be effective if the award
of punitive damages do not cause the defendant to suffer. Sales & Cole, cited at note 10, at
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In any proceeding where there is state action that can poten-
tially deprive a person of his or her life, liberty or property, the
person is entitled to due process.127 Under full statutory extraction,
the defendant's due process rights are protected because the de-
mand notifies the defendant that he must defend against punitive
damages.'28 This notification allows the defendant to prepare a de-
fense against the claim for punitive damages.
Full statutory extraction of punitive damages does not require
the state to change the burden of proof required of the plaintiff.
However, it can be argued that the burden of proof for awarding
punitive damages should be clear and convincing evidence. 29
Should the jury return a verdict for punitive damages, the de-
fendant would be able to move for remittitur or new trial. The
court would then determine whether the jury's award was the re-
sult of passion, bias, or other improper motive.1 30 Where the court
1147. In so doing, these jurisdictions set an award of punitive damages higher in some cases
and lower in others for the same wrong. In theory, the defendant's wealth is irrelevant as a
factor in setting the punitive damage award: a wrong committed by a wealthy defendant
injures society to the same extent as the exact same wrong committed by a poor defendant.
Under full statutory extraction there is no incentive for the plaintiff to litigate the issue of
wealth since he is not the beneficiary of the punitive damage award. Aside from judicial
economy, not introducing evidence of the defendant's wealth also preserves the privacy of
the defendant. This is important where the plaintiff cannot make out a prima facie case for
punitive damages.
However, what is adequate deterrence to one person, may not be for another. Therefore,
bifurcation of the punitive damages issue from the defendant's liability may offer a method
of preserving the defendant's privacy while at the same time ensuring an adequate level of
deterrence. With bifurcation, discovery of the defendant's wealth would take place before
the trial that determines the defendant's liability. However, evidence of the defendant's
wealth would only be presented after the jury found the defendant liable of the wrongful
conduct. Wheeler, cited at note 10, at 300. The trial judge would then make a determination
of whether the plaintiff has made out a prima facie case for punitive damages. If so, the trial
would enter a second phase to assess punitive damages at which point the plaintiff would
then be able to introduce evidence of the defendant's wealth.
127. See, e.g., Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186 (1977) (holding that traditional quasi in
rem jurisdiction is constitutionally inadequate for lack of proper notice before deciding the
dispute over the property); Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976) (due process af-
fords to every person the right to be treated with fundamental fairness). See also notes 75-
92 and accompanying text.
128. 22 AM. JUR. 2D Damages § 819 (1988) (state and federal courts require that a
demand for punitive damages be made so as to put the defendant on notice as to what he
must defend against).
129. Shores, cited at note 118, at 88.
130. Id. at 92. It has been argued that "awarding exemplary damages to the state
might permit the jury to take a more objective view of the defendant's motives and conduct,
divorced from sympathy or dictate for the plaintiff." Note, Exemplary Damages in the Law
of Torts, 70 HARv. L. REV. 517, 517 (1957). But see, Steven J. Sensibar, Punitive Damages: A
Look at Origins and Legitimacy, 41 FED'N. INS. & CORP. COUNS. Q. 375, 387 (1991) (Punitive
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concludes that the verdict was the result of passion, bias, or other
improper motive, the court could order a new trial. However, if
this is not the case, the trial judge would next consider whether the
punitive damage award was excessive based on the evidence of the
defendant's conduct.' 13 Where the court determines the verdict is
excessive, the court may deny the defendant's motion for a new
trial conditioned upon the plaintiff's remittitur in the amount de-
termined by the court. 3
C. Function of the Jury and Appellate Review
The jury that determines the defendant's liability is in the best
position to determine the compensatory and punitive damage
awards.' 3 Full statutory extraction does not change the function of
the jury. However, proper jury instructions that explain the differ-
ences and applications of each are necessary to ensure that the
plaintiff is fully compensated for his or her actual injuries.
34
The common law method of instructing the jury is not only con-
stitutional,3 5 but is also the proper method for use with full statu-
tory extraction. When instructing juries on the amount to award as
punitive damages, the court normally explains that the jurors may,
in their discretion, award an amount that is sufficient to punish the
defendant and to protect the public by deterring the defendant
and others from engaging in similar conduct.3 6 As long as the
damage awards would more than increase, "[tihey would follow the Voyager spacecraft out
of the solar system." Id.).
131. Shores, cited at note 118, at 92.
132. See generally, FED. R. Cw. P. 50 & 59.
133. Even if the punitive damages issue is bifurcated from the liability issue, the jury
that determined the defendant's liability is in the best position to determine the level of
punishment and deterrence necessary because it will have heard all the evidence.
134. Some commentators have argued that juries tend to mix the awards together
causing the compensatory damages to be less than compensatory and the punitive damages
to be more than punishment and deterrence. See, e.g., Clarence Morris, Punitive Damages
in Personal Injury Cases, 21 OHIo ST. L.J. 216, 226 (1960) ("[Tlhe latitude permitted in
calculating personal injury award[s] is so wide that proof of defendant's outrage will en-
hance some verdicts without an express instruction allowing punitive damages." Id.).
Other commentators have argued that trials should be bifurcated so that the issue of
punitive damages is tried only after the liability of the defendant is established. Wheeler,
cited at note 10, at 300; see also note 126. The rationale is that to prevent swaying the jury,
inflammatory evidence of the defendant's conduct will not be present at the trial that deter-
mines the defendant's liability. Wheeler, cited at note 10, at 301. Only California and Geor-
gia have enacted bifurcated trial procedures for punitive damages cases. CAL. Civ. CODE
§ 3295 (West Supp. 1992); GA. CODE ANN. § 15-12-5.1 (Michie Supp. 1992).
135. Pacific Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 111 S. Ct. 1032, 1042 (1991).
136. See Model Jury Instruction quoted in GHIARDI & KIRCHER, cited at note 13, ch.
11; Haslip, 111 S. Ct. at 1037 n.1 (quoting the Alabama jury instruction).
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standards are "sufficiently definite and meaningful" so as to con-
strain the discretion of the jury, a defendant's due process rights
will not be violated.
13 7
Reasonableness requires that the state provide a procedure for
the trial judge or appellate courts to review the amount of punitive
damages awarded by the jury. Further, to be reasonable, there
must be a rational relationship between the amount of the punitive
damages awarded and the amount necessary to punish and de-
ter. 38 Additionally, "[p]unitive damages should bear a reasonable
relationship to the harm that is likely to occur from the defend-
ant's conduct as well as to the harm that has actually occurred. '" 9
Judicial review of reasonableness may be self-imposed by the
courts, or the legislature may establish the reasonableness stan-
dard." " As long as review is possible, this method of awarding pu-
nitive damages does not violate due process,"" even if the jury is
given significant discretion in determining the amount of the
award. " 2
Therefore, states that enact full statutory extraction14 3 should
continue to use the common law methods of jury instruction and
allow the jury to determine the size of the award, subject to judi-
cial review for reasonableness. Merely codifying the common law
rules should not impact this result.'" In either case, the critical
137. Haslip, 111 S. Ct. at 1045; also see notes 75-92 and accompanying text.
138. Haslip, 111 S. Ct. at 1045-46. The traditional test of reasonableness is "that puni-
tive damages must bear a reasonable relationship to [the] compensatory damages." Galligan,
cited at note 38, at 34.
139. TXO Prod. Corp. v. Alliance Resources Crop., 419 S.E.2d 870, 909 (W. Va. 1992),
aff'd, 113 S. Ct. 2711, 2721 (1993) (citing this passage with approval).
140. Justice Kennedy criticized the reasonableness standard as "nothing more than [a
court's] own subjective reaction to a particular punitive damages award." TXO Prod., 113 S.
Ct. at 2725. The Justice would change the focus of reviewing a punitive damages award
away from the amount awarded to the jury reasons for awarding it. Id.
141. Haslip, 111 S. Ct. at 1043.
142. Id. at 1044. Discretion cannot be unlimited, but must be "confined to deterrence
and retribution, . . . the state policy concerns sought to be advanced." Id.
Some commentators suggest that appellate courts must make a presumption that the jury
acted reasonably in determining liability and unreasonably in granting punitive damages.
Wheeler, cited at note 10, at 301. They argue that bifurcation eliminates this split presump-
tion since the issue of liability is established first. Id.
143. A state's legislature does not have to enact a statute in order for the state to
enjoy the benefits of statutory extraction. "Courts have the inherent authority to allocate
punitive damage awards without legislation directing such allocation." Shores, cited at note
118, at 90. Such an allocation of punitive damages would, however, require the court to
determine the beneficiary of the award and administrate the payment.
144. Browning-Ferris Indus., Inc. v. Kelco Disposal, Inc., 492 U.S. 257, 281 (1989)
(Brennan, J., concurring) (stating "[w]ithout statutory (or at least common law) standards
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elements are ensuring that the jury is given clear instructions on
the purpose of punitive damages and the factors and evidence that
it must consider in determining the size of the award.
D. Plaintiff's Incentive and Attorney Fees
It makes no difference to the defendant, who must pay punitive
damages, whether he or she must pay them to the plaintiff or to
the state. If paid to the state, however, the plaintiff will lack an
incentive to pursue punitive damages because the plaintiff is not
the beneficiary of the award. After all, why should the plaintiff pay
an attorney to pursue and prosecute the elements necessary to re-
cover punitive damages if the plaintiff will not receive an economic
benefit from such an expenditure?
In order to ensure that a plaintiff pursues punitive damages
under full statutory extraction, the plaintiff's litigation costs, in-
cluding reasonable attorney fees,145 would be paid from the puni-
tive damage award.146 After the plaintiff's judgment for compensa-
tory damages has been satisfied, the defendant would make
payment directly to the clerk of courts for the punitive damages
assessed. The clerk of courts would then, upon the trial judge's or-
der, pay the plaintiff any costs incurred,147 the plaintiff's attorney
fees, and forward the remainder to the compensation fund. Under
full statutory extraction, the state is the judgment creditor for the
punitive damage award. Making payment to the clerk of courts di-
rectly avoids the issue of a "taking."148 The result of this process is
that compensatory damages become truly compensatory because
the plaintiff's litigation costs are entirely paid, and punitive dam-
ages perform their primary function of deterrence and
punishment.49
for the determination of how large an award of punitive damages" should be, juries have too
little guidance. Id.); Haslip, 111 S. Ct. 1032, 1067 (O'Connor, J. dissenting) (stating she
would require states to adopt some method, either by the legislature or the courts, to con-
strain jury discretion in fixing the amount of punitive damage awards).
145. This incentive includes that portion of the plaintiff's attorney fees attributable to
proving the compensatory damages portion of the trial.
146. Payment of attorney fees would be made without regard to the compensatory-
punitive damages split.
147. Costs incurred by the plaintiff may include, for example, unpaid time off from
employment to bring the action for punitive damages. The rationale for this is that the
plaintiff is doing society a favor by prosecuting a suit for society's benefit, and hence, should
not incur a cost in so doing.
148. See notes 103-114 and accompanying text.
149. Some commentators have argued that by allowing the plaintiff to recover litiga-
tion costs from the punitive damage award, the plaintiff is given an unfair advantage over
1994
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In determining the attorney fees, the trial judge should be given
broad discretion, with the attorney-client fee agreement as the
starting point. It would not matter whether the plaintiff agreed to
pay an hourly rate or a contingency fee to the attorney.150
The trial judge must also be given broad discretion to strike
from the pleading the demand for punitive damages to insure that
the plaintiff's attorney seeks punitive damages only in a proper
case.' 51 Therefore, a plaintiff who cannot make out a case for puni-
tive damages would not be paying his or her attorney for trying to
prove the necessary elements.152
If a plaintiff demands punitive damages, and the judge does not
strike the demand from the case, but the jury does not return an
award for punitive damages, the plaintiff would not be required to
pay the attorney for pursuing the punitive damages demanded.
Rather, the trial judge would make a determination of the reasona-
ble value of the attorney's work in pursuing the punitive damages
claim and issue an order entitling the attorney to seek payment
from the compensation fund in the amount specified by the judge's
order.15 s Payment from the compensation fund ensures that attor-
neys continue to seek legitimate claims for punitive damages.
There are cases where the defendant's wrong justifies assessing
the defendant. Breslo, cited at note 23, at 1136. Under the American Rule, the successful
party is not awarded attorney fees unless such are granted by statute. DOUGLAS LAYCOCK,
MODERN AMERICAN REMEDIES 2 (1989). A plaintiff who recovers only compensatory damages
is not made whole because he must pay his attorney. Ghiardi, cited at note 66, at 194.
Hence, the American Rule actually may cause a successful plaintiff to incur a loss.
Where punitive damages can be awarded, the plaintiff will, in most cases, be able to cover
litigation costs whether the state follows the common law or statutory extraction. Even if
this truly is an unfair advantage, the plaintiff would not have gained the advantage but for
the defendant's egregious conduct.
150. The statute could require the trial judge to justify any decision where the attor-
ney's fees are reduced from those requested. Further, the state should allow the attorney to
appeal the trial judge's decision. For contingency fee agreements, the state may seek to
impose a limit such as 25% of the total of compensatory and punitive damages or some form
of a sliding scale based on the size of the award.
151. Professor Owen suggested a judge be given power to "screen out" improper
claims for punitive damages for the purpose of promoting fairness and efficiency even under
the current system of awarding punitive damages. Owen, cited at note 21, at 120.
152. The trial judge's power to strike a demand for punitive damages should extend
up to the time of trial. In making this decision, the trial judge could review all discovered
material on either side. If the trial judge determines that there is a reasonable likelihood
that the jury will return an award for punitive damages, the judge should let the claim go
forward.
153. In this situation, the attorney's efforts should be based on the prevailing local
hourly rate regardless of the fee arrangement with the client. It is entirely possible for the
attorney to bring a claim of quantum meruit against the state for the services rendered;
after all, the state is the beneficiary of the attorney's efforts.
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punitive damages but the actual injury suffered by the plaintiff is
insignificant. Under the current system of awarding punitive dam-
ages, if the total award is not large enough to cover the plaintiff's
compensatory damages and attorney fees, the plaintiff will proba-
bly not bring suit because doing so would result in a pecuniary
loss. The result is that the defendant is not punished for wrongful
conduct. Where there is a shortfall, statutory extraction would al-
low the attorney to recover the amount of the shortfall from the
compensation fund. Further, the plaintiff has an incentive to bring
suit to recover compensatory damages for his or her injury regard-
less of how small. 15 The assessment of punitive damages also pun-
ishes the defendant and deters him and others from engaging in
low injury wrongs that otherwise would have gone unpunished.
It is not clear whether full statutory extraction would reduce the
number of claims for punitive damages, but it is clear that allowing
plaintiffs to keep punitive damage awards promotes persons to be-
come "eager victims. ' ' 155 An eager victim consciously increases his
or her losses by allowing the defendant to act wrongfully.1 56 Full
statutory extraction would reduce the number of "eager victim"
cases by taking away the incentive to become a victim.
E. The Settlement Process
One advantage of full statutory extraction is that it provides an
incentive to settle rather than to litigate. The main reason for this
is that plaintiffs would be entitled to keep any amount the defend-
ant is willing to pay in settlement of the plaintiff's claim. This in-
cludes amounts greater than that necessary to compensate the
plaintiff for his or her injuries.
Under statutory extraction, a plaintiff will seek to settle at any
amount that is equal to or greater than the plaintiff's actual injury.
Of course, the plaintiff will also factor in the probability of suc-
ceeding in litigation should the plaintiff be forced to pursue the
claim in court. However, the plaintiff's attorney fees are recovered
under full statutory extraction and, thus, this is not a factor for the
154. Cases where the compensatory damages are low may be important to society (e.g.,
activity that results in a large number of small injuries, infringement of the right to vote,
etc.). Dan B. Dobbs, Ending Punishment in "Punitive" Damages: Deterrence-Measured
Remedies, 40 ALA. L. REV. 831, 846-48 (1989). The punitive damage award pays the attorney
fee for the plaintiff who acts as a "private attorney general." Id. at 847.
155. Toy, cited at note 39, at 328.
156. Id. at 328-29.
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plaintiff in determining whether to settle or not.157
The defendant will settle at any amount that is less than what
the defendant would pay in compensatory and punitive damages
plus the defendant's litigation costs. The defendant will also factor
in the probability of his or her being held liable if forced to go to
court. Under full statutory extraction, punitive damages act as an
incentive for each side to settle because, should the case go to trial,
the defendant would still be liable for punitive damages even
though the plaintiff would not receive the award. Setiling allows
the plaintiff to receive more than his or her expected award and
the defendant to pay less than his or her expected liability.
The following example will illustrate how full statutory extrac-
tion would impact the settlement process. 158 Assuming a non-statu-
tory extraction scheme, the plaintiff may estimate his or her com-
pensatory award at $10,000, punitive damages award at $10,000,
litigation costs at $1,000, and settlement costs at $500. The plain-
tiff may view the probability of success for each award at fifty per-
cent, respectively. Hence, the plaintiff would be willing to settle at
any amount over $9,500.119 Assuming that the defendant estimates
the same amounts for each award, estimates a fifty- percent
probability of being held liable on each award, and has the same
litigation costs and settlement costs, then the defendant will settle
at any amount less than $10,500.16° Therefore, the plaintiff and de-
fendant in this example will agree on any amount between $9,500
and $10,500.
The only difference between a nonstatutory extraction scheme
157. However, settlement costs are a factor that both the plaintiff and the defendant
must consider. Presumably, these costs will be less than the expected litigation costs.
158. The examples used in this comment are a modified version of examples from
Breslo, cited at note 23, at 1158-61. The modification made herein is that this comment
argues in favor of having attorney fees paid from the punitive damage award or from the
compensation fund.
Breslo provides a thorough economic explanation of the settlement process under a plan
similar to full statutory extraction.
159. The plaintiff's settlement amount is determined by the summation of (1) the
compensatory damages multiplied by the probability of success, (2) the plaintiff's estimation
of the punitive damages multiplied by the probability of success, and (3) subtracting the
estimated litigation costs plus the estimated settlement costs. Mathematically:
($10,000 X .50) + ($10,000 X .50) - $1000 + $500 = $9,500.
160. The defendant's settlement amount is determined by the summation of (1) the
defendant's estimate of the compensatory damages multiplied by the probability of liability,
(2) the defendant's estimation of punitive damages multiplied by the probability of liability,
and (3) the defendant's litigation costs minus the difference between litigation costs and
settlement costs. Mathematically:
($10,000 X .50) + ($10,000 X .50) + $1000 - $500 = $10,500.
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and a full statutory extraction is that the plaintiff's expected puni-
tive damages would be zero. The defendant must still factor an
award of punitive damages into the amount he is willing to pay to
settle. Thus, the plaintiff would be willing to settle for any amount
above $5,500.1a The defendant would still be willing to settle at
any amount less than $10,500 since nothing has changed for him.
In either case, settlements are possible, but the mere fact that
the possible settlement range is larger under statutory extraction
suggests that plaintiffs and defendants are more likely to reach a
settlement favorable to both. Each side will benefit from settle-
ment under full statutory extraction. For the above example, as-
suming a settlement at the midpoint, or $8,000, the defendant
would pay $2,500 less than the defendant would expect to pay if he
or she were forced to go to trial. 162 Likewise, the plaintiff would
receive $2,500 more than the plaintiff would expect to receive if
the plaintiff were forced to press his or her claims.6 3
Where the parties do in fact settle, the state should not have an
interest in the amount that may represent punitive damages. This
would be the case where the plaintiff receives more from the settle-
ment than his or her actual injuries. The state would discourage
settlement if it were to do otherwise.
VI. CONCLUSION
Full statutory extraction is a method of tort reform that pre-
vents the plaintiff from receiving a punitive damages windfall.
Proper implementation of statutory extraction would not be dis-
ruptive to the state's legal system, but would easily fit within it.
The state, however, would need to formulate administrative proce-
dures for the effective tracking and execution of punitive damage
awards.
161. ($10,000 X .50) + ($0 X .50) + $0 + $500 = $5,500. The plaintiff's attorney fees
are paid from the punitive damage award or the compensation fund if litigation is necessary.
162. There is a drawback to this approach. Where the defendant settles for less than
what the defendant otherwise would have paid had the suit gone to trial, it can be argued
that the defendant is not effectively punished.
163. There are, of course, a number of reasons why the settlement process could break
down: (1) both parties are overly optimistic of their probability of success at trial; (2) one
party may try to squeeze the other causing ill will and spite; (3) the plaintiff may not be
financially motivated, but motivated by punishing the defendant; (4) the defendant may
prefer to defend against all claimants. Breslo, cited at note 23, at 1161 (citing, ROBERT
COOTER & THOMAS ULEN, LAW AND ECONOMICS 485-86 (1988); Elizabeth Hoffman & Matthew
L. Spitzer, Experimental Tests of the Coase Theorem with Large Bargaining Groups, 15 J.
LEGAL STUD. 149, 168 (1986)).
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Statutory extraction offers several advantages over the common
law method of allowing the plaintiff to keep a punitive damage
award. First, statutory extraction avoids windfalls for the plaintiff
that the common law cannot avoid. Second, statutory extraction
benefits society by accomplishing the purposes of punishment and
deterrence and by establishing a tort victims' compensation fund
for those claimants who cannot collect their compensatory judg-
ments. Finally, with the exception of eager victim cases, statutory
extraction should not reduce the number of punitive damages
cases, but will help to ensure that only legitimate cases for punitive
damages are brought forward.
There are a number of constitutional issues that must be ad-
dressed when crafting the legislation necessary to implement statu-
tory extraction. The Fifth Amendment Takings Clause can be
avoided by requiring the defendant to pay the award directly to
the state via the clerk of courts. The statute must also expressly
state that the state is the judgment creditor to the punitive dam-
age award, and the plaintiff has no right to the award.
However, in avoiding the Takings Clause, the statute may run
afoul of the Excessive Fines Clause. Only by giving trial judges and
appellate courts broad discretion to ensure that the punishment
fits the wrong and to reduce damage awards that are unreasonable
will the state be able to avoid the Excessive Fines Clause. Never-
theless, the state must not cap punitive damage awards, otherwise,
wrongful conduct would be undeterred.
Finally, even though the state is to be considered a judgment
creditor, the state should not have any interest in the litigation or
its outcome, nor should the state be able to compel a claimant to
seek punitive damages. In addition, should the plaintiff and de-
fendant settle, the state must not have an interest in the settle-
ment, nor should the state seek payment from the settlement.
Careful navigation of the constitutional issues would result in ef-
fective extraction of punitive damages. This writer believes that
extraction of punitive damages would serve our legal system well.
Leo M. Stepanian II
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